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COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SYMBOLIC SPEECH -
Colorado Flag Desecration Statute
INTRODUCTION
C OLORADO'S present flag desecration statute will be replaced
on July 1, 1972 by section 40-11-204 of the new Colorado
Criminal Code.' The applicable portion of the new statute
provides:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to mutilate, deface,
trample upon, burn, cut, or tear any flag in public:
(a) With intent to cast contempt or ridicule upon such
flag; or
(b) With intent to outrage the sensibilities of persons
liable to observe or discover the action or its results;
or
(c) With intent to cause a breach of the peace or incite-
ment to riot; or
(d) Under such circumstances that it may cause a breach
of the peace or incitement to riot.
(2) "Flag" as used in this section, means any flag, ensign,
banner, standard, colors, or replica or representation
thereof which is an official or commonly recognized sym-
bol of the United States of America or the State of
Colorado.
2
Recently, statutes such as this have frequently been used
to prosecute persons for acts ranging from representing the
flag with dollar signs instead of stars, to writing "Give peace
a chance" and placing peace symbols on flags to be worn on
jackets, to the actual burning or tearing of flags3 - acts which
were or may have been intended to convey specific ideas of a
political nature to observers. The fact that today these statutes
are often enforced against dissenters4 whose conduct constitutes
symbolic speech, and not against the original targets of the
statutes-those who used flags for advertising and commercial
purposes5 - has caused several federal courts to invalidate
1 Ch. 121, § 40-11-204, [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 480.
2 Id. § 40-11-204(1)- (2).
3 See Note, Flag Desecration - the Unsettled Issue, 46 NoTRE DAME LAw-
YER 201 (1970).
4 See generally Note, Desecration of the American Flag, 3 IND. LEGAL F.
159 (1969), and Note, Freedom of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The
Crime of Flag Desecration, 12 ARIz. L. REV. 71 (1970).
5 See UNIFORM FLAG ACT, 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. (1966), Commissioners'
Prefatory Note.
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similar statutes in other states. It is the object of this comment
to briefly examine cases which invalidated those statutes and
to suggest that the Colorado statute may similarly be un-
constitutional.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK
In dealing with flag desecration statutes, courts have typi-
cally relied on the first amendment freedom of speech protec-
tion in one of two ways, i.e., as protection of words spoken, or
as protection of words implicit in symbolic conduct. Although
opinions usually mention both approaches, whether or not
the statute will be declared unconstitutional may depend
upon which variation on the freedom of speech doctrine is
emphasized.
A. Street v. New York
The first of these two doctrines is that arising from the
most recent 6 Supreme Court case involving flag desecration-
Street v. New York. 7 Street was convicted under a statute that
made it a misdemeanor to "publicly mutilate, deface, defile or
defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or
act"" any flag of the United States. Street had burned a flag
in response to the shooting of James Meredith. When ques-
tioned by police, the defendant stated "If they let that happen
to Meredith we don't need an American flag."9 The Supreme
Court reversed his conviction because he may have been con-
victed for his words or for both his words and his deeds, rather
than solely for his conduct, on the basis that the statute had
been unconstitutionally applied. The Street doctrine, therefore,
would not allow conviction under a statute which failed to dis-
tinguish between words and acts in its prohibition of flag
desecration.
Street has been cited by a few courts as authority for the
constitutionality of flag desecration laws. In Sutherland v.
6 Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), is an early case in which the
Nebraska flag desecration law was declared constitutional. However,
in that case, defendants had displayed a flag on the label of a bottle
of beer as a means of advertising and free speech or symobilc speech
was not an issue. See generally Desecration of the American Flag, 3 IND.
LEGAL F. 159 (1969).
7394 U.S. 576 (1969).
8 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1425(16) (d) (1909). In 1967, § 1425(16), was super-
seded by § 136 of the General Business Law, which in par. d defines
the offense in identical language. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 136(d)
(McKinney 1968); 394 U.S. at 578 n.1.
9, 394 U.S. at 579.
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DeWul1 ° a three-judge district court 1 refused to declare the
Illinois flag desecration statute void on its face and treated
Street as controlling:
Thus, the Supreme Court was presented with the question
of whether a statutory provision, nearly identical to the one
challenged in the present case, was void on its face for over-
breadth. It chose to limit its holding to the statute as applied
and refused to make a broader holding. This court views that
Supreme Court refusal to be of controlling significance to the
question of overbreadth presented in this case.
12
Although the North Carolina law was declared unconstitu-
tional both for vagueness and overbreadth in Parker v.
Morgan,13 a three-judge district court indicated that it did not
believe all flag desecration laws are necessarily unconstitu-
tional. In Parker, the court stated that the definition of a flag
- a definition very similar to that in most statutes1 4 - was
"simply unbelievable," and that the definition alone was suf-
ficient to void the statute. The North Carolina law also referred
to casting contempt "by words or act" (emphasis added) -
which the court held to be clearly invalid under Street.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Hoff-
man v. United States15 agreed that Abbie Hoffman's conduct
(wearing a shirt that came within the statutory definition of
a flag, but which was not an actual flag) did not come within
the condemnation of the federal flag desecration statute, and
reversed his conviction. It did not reach the constitutional
10 323 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
11 Most of the recent flag desecration cases were requests that state statutes
be declared unconstitutional. A three-judge district court must be em-
panelled before granting an interlocutory or permanent injunction re-
straining the enforcement, operation, or execution of a state statute. 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). The district judge to whom application was made
and at least one circuit judge must be on the court designated by the
chief judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970). When civil suits are required to be
heard and determined by a three-judge district court, unless otherwise
provided by law, appeals are made directly to the Supreme Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
12 323 F. Supp. at 747.
13 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971). Plaintiff Parker had worn a jacket
on the back of which he had sewn an American flag, over which was
superimposed the legend "Give peace a chance" and the depiction of a
hand with index and middle finger forming a "V." Plaintiff Berg had
affixed a flag to the ceiling of his automobile for his own personal enjoy-
ment and satisfaction, and "apparently without any purpose to communi-
cate an idea." Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
14 This comment does not attempt to distinguish the relatively minor dif-
ferences in statutory language. One possible point of discussion, how-
ever, is whether the statute purports to proscribe casting contempt on
the flag by "words or act" as in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969),
or only by "an act" as in Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). If the statutes are voided on the grounds that the conduct is
symbolic speech, it would appear to make no difference whether acts
alone, or words and acts, were proscribed.
15 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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question, but added, "[W] e have little doubt that the interest
of the people in the flag of the United States enables Congress
by appropriate legislation to protect it from desecration.""' As
authority, the court cited the dissenting opinions in Street ana
the fact the majority in Street did not dispute their allegations.
In summary, those courts which have relied predominantly
on Street have regarded a prohibition on words spoken as the
fatal element in statutes of broad scope. The alternative theory,
discussed below, does not rely on a distinction between words
and acts.
B. United States v. O'Brien
Most federal courts have characterized flag desecration as
symbolic speech and applied the theory of United States v.
O'Brien.'7 Though it affirmed the conviction of one who had
burned his draft card, the court in O'Brien noted that when
"speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental in-
terest in regulating the nonspeech element may justify inci-
dental limitations on first amendment freedoms. Lower courts
have generally found that flag desecration statutes do not meet
the O'Brien criteria, 8 and the forbidden conduct violates first
amendment freedoms.
In Hodsdon v. Buckson' 9 a three-judge district court ruled
the Delaware statute20 was unconstitutionally overbroad and
proscribed symbolic speech.21 The court stated that "[T]his law
encompasses acts which bear no relation to any interest within
16 Id. at 228.
17 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
18 The O'Brien criteria for upholding such a statute are:
(1) It must be within the constitutional power of the govern-
ment,
(2) It must further an important or substantial governmental
interest,
(3) The governmental interest must be unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression, and
(4) The incidental restriction on alleged first amendment
freedoms must be no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest. 391 U.S. at 377.
19 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
20 The applicable portion of the statute read:
Whoever publicly mutilates, defaces, defiles, defies, tramples
upon or casts contempt either by word or act, upcn (the Ameri-
can flag) - Shall be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned notmore than 30 days or both. Id. at 531.
21 310 F. Supp. at 534. Plaintiff was seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief requiring the attorney general to stop prosecuting him for flying
the United Nations flag in the position of honor with the United States
flag at half mast.
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the legislative competence and which are intended and under-
stood as symbolic speech.
'22
Another three-judge district court in Crosson v. Silver,
2
citing O'Brien as the controlling precedent, ruled the Arizona
statute2 4 unconstitutionally overbroad and an inhibition of sym-
bolic speech. 25 The court determined with little discussion that
flag desecration can be symbolic speech by noting:
While we need not here determine whether all conduct in-
tended to express an idea is symbolic speech, we think it is
self-evident that most if not all conduct associated with the
United States flag is symbolic speech .... Further, such con-
duct is invariably successful in communicating the idea.
26
The court also declared:
We find nothing inherent in the act which stimulates those
viewers who sympathize with the aims of the desecrator to en-
gage in unlawful acts, such as rioting. Nor is the protection of
the "sensibilities of passersby" the proper concern of State.
27
Language such as this definitely casts doubt on the validity
of section 1(b) of the new Colorado statute.
In Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn,
28
another action brought before a three-judge district court to
enjoin enforcement of a state flag desecration statute, the dis-
trict court held the New York statute constitutional - but ruled
that it did not apply to plaintiffs' emblem.2" The Second Circuit
',2 Id.
23 319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970).
24 The statute declared unconstitutional read:
A person who publicly mutilates, defaces, defiles, tramples upon,
or by word or act casts contempt upon a flag is guilty of a mis-
demeanor .... ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-793(C) (1956).
It has subsequently been amended to read:
No person shall publicly cast contempt upon, mutilate, deface,
defile, burn, trample or otherwise dishonor or cause to bring
dishonor upon a flag in a manner likely to provoke retaliation.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-793 (Supp. 1971-72).
The constitutionality of the new statute has not yet been ruled upon
by the courts.
2.5 319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970). Plaintiff was seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief restraining the county attorney from further criminal
proceedings against her for publicly burning or aiding and abetting the
public burning of a United States flag with intent to cast contempt
upon the flag.
26 Id. at 1086 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
28 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 322 F. Supp. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
Gwathmey v. Town of East Hampton, 437 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1970), is a
companion case to Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee in
which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that because the New
York statute was unconstitutional, there was no need to convene a three-
judge district court to hear the plaintiffs' case.
29 The emblem consisted of a circular representation of the American
flag, having seven stars in the upper left-hand corner and eleven stripes




Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, but held the law un-
constitutional both on its face because of overbreadth (it failed
to provide adequate guidance to enforcement officials as to
what was proscribed), and as applied in the case on the grounds
that it was symbolic speech (this was the plaintiffs' means of
expressing their views on a vital political issue). A
Whether the Colorado statute would be declared uncon-
stitutional or not will depend on the doctrine followed by the
court. If the court should interpret Street as authority that
some statutes can be constitutional, it may be upheld-and
subsequently have its application limited by courts that deter-
mine it has been unconstitutionally applied. If the court should
characterize flag desecration as symbolic speech satisfying the
O'Brien criteria, as most other courts have done, the statute
would probably be held unconstitutional on its face.
II. CONCLUSION
It is doubtful that the Colorado flag desecration statute
could withstand a constitutional challenge. It is highly similar
to the North Carolina, New York, Arizona, and Delaware
statutes that federal courts have recently declared facially
unconstitutional, unconstitutionally overboard, or as inhibi-
tions of free (symbolic) speech. Moreover, the Colorado statute
is not unlike the Maryland31 and federal legislation - legisla-
tion found to have been unconstitutionally applied in particular
cases.
Since the Colorado statute shows a substantial legislative
concern.2 with the potential for riot which attends acts of flag
desecration, the inciting to riot provisions of the Colorado
30 But see Oldroyd v. Kugler, 327 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.J. 1970). Plaintiffs
were seeking to enjoin enforcement of the New Jersey flag desecration
statute. In a per curiam opinion, the three-judge district court granted
the state's motion to dismiss. The court, probably as dictum, stated:
"We find that the above statute on its face is precise, clear and consti-
tutional." Id. at 177. Also in dictum, the court relied upon the lower
court opinion in Hoffman v. United States which was subsequently re-
versed. 256 A.2d 567 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969), rev'd, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
31 See Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) where a three-judge
district court declined to hold the Maryland statute unconstitutional--
only that it had been unconstitutionally applied where university officials
attempted to prohibit publication of a student-supported magazine with
a burning flag on the cover upon the advice of Maryland's Attorney
General that it would be a violation of the law. The court specifically
noted (at 142-43) that it did not reach the question of whether the
statute was unconstitutional on its face.
32 Ch. 121, § 40-11-204(1) (b)-(d), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 480 (subsec-
tions quoted p. 451 supra).
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Criminal Code 33 may enable the state to prosecute without sac-
rificing individual rights of communication protected by the
first amendment. Of course, where the dissenting activity does
not meet the five-person provisions of the code,34 the riot pro-
visions would not be a satisfactory prosecutorial tool in lieu
of a voided flag desecration statute. Thus, when the activity
is individualized- as in the cases explored in this comment
-there is no reason to assume Colorado will be any more
successful in stifling the first amendment freedom of speech
than were the other states discussed above.
Rodney D. Knutson
33 Ch. 121, § 40-9-102(1)- (2), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 467, adequately pro-
scribes inciting to riot:
(1) A person commits inciting riot if he:
(a) Incites or urges a group of five or more persons to
engage in a current or impending riot; or
(b) Gives commands, instructions, or signals to a group
of five or more persons in furtherance of a riot.
(2) A person may be convicted under sections 40-2-101, 40-
2-201, or 40-2-301, of attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to incite
a riot only if he engages in the prohibited conduct with respect
to a current or impending riot.
(3) Inciting riot is a class 1 misdemeanor [with a minimum
sentence of 6 months imprisonment, or $500 fine, or both, and a
maximum sentence of 24 months imprisonment, or $5,000 or
both-Section 40-1-106], but if injury to a person or damage
to property results therefrom, it is a class 5 felony [with a mini-
mum sentence of 1 year, or $1,000 fine, and a maximum sentence
of 5 years, or $15,000 fine, or both - Section 40-1-105].
34 Id. § 40-9-102(1).
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